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CHAPTER I 
SUBMARINE WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This study is within the subject of public international law. More spe-
cifically, it concerns the laws of war which are designed to promote hu-
manitarianism by mitigating the destruction of human and material values 
which is involved in war. At 'the outset, it should be stated that it would 
be far better to abolish war in the present highly interdependent world 
community than merely to control it. Until it can be abolished, however, 
it is necessary to control it as effectively as possible because of the tre-
mendous destructiveness of contemporary weapons and the crucial im-
portance of the values to be protected.1 
In view of the large number of limited wars which have taken place 
since the conclusion of the Second World War, the juridical regulation of 
war is a practical matter in the world community both now and in the 
foreseeable future. Limited wars reflect the common interest of the com-
munity of states in minimizing the extensity and intensity of the coercion 
employed. 2 If limited wars are to be kept limited rather than be "esca-
lated" into general wars it is essential to apply the insights of public inter-
national law to this task. 
This study focuses attention upon that part of the laws of war which 
regulate naval warfare, and more particularly, submarine warfare. During 
the World Wars two of the most important groups of juridical issues in 
naval warfare have related to the long-distance naval blockade enforced 
by surface warships and to submarine warfare. By using submarine war-
fare as an organizing principle it is not necessary to give consideration to 
many of the traditional and routine juridical issues of naval warfare which 
are covered adequately elsewhere. 3 
The present study employs both customary international law (the im-
plicit agreement of states) and treaty or conventional international law 
1 Not all international lawyers agree with the text. See, e.g., Professor Fenwick: 
"The laws of war belong to a past age and except for a few minor matters of no 
consequence, it is futile to attempt to revive them .... War has got beyond the 
control of law .... " 43 Pro c. A.S.I.L. 110 ( 1949). 
2 See generally Osgood passim and Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age 
( 1963). 
3 Tucker is a text which considers the traditional laws of war at sea. 
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(the explicit agreement of states), rather than being restricted to tradi-
tional judicial materials. Judicial materials, including the war crimes trials, 
will be considered and applied in the inquiry where they are relevant. 
A. THE SUBMARINE IN NAVAL WARFARE 
In examining the law of submarine warfare one may profit from some 
knowledge of the submarine and its role in warfare. The object of naval 
warfare is sometimes stated to be the obtaining of control of the sea for 
one's own purposes while denying its use to the enemy.4 Submarines, like 
other warships, may be used to achieve this objective. The unique ability 
of the submarine warship to submerge enables it to operate independently 
in high seas areas where the enemy maintains general control over the 
surface of the sea. 5 
The history of submarine warfare, or of warfare submerged, may be 
traced in Herodotus to the famous feat of Scyllias of Scion and his diving 
daughter who, we are told, swam under the ships of Xerxes and cut their 
anchor chains. 6 Submarine warships were employed in war prior to the 
First World War. 7 It was not until their extended use in that war, however, 
that their military significance as warships was recognized.8 Before that 
war the principal projected use of submarines was against surface warships 
rather than against merchant ships. 9 
1. The Dual-Powered Submarine 
a. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Other than its submergibility, the most striking characteristic of 
'See Potter & Nimitz 2. 
5 "(T]he submarine still remains the only type of ship-and here I include aircraft 
in the term 'ship'-that can maintain itself unsupported for long periods in the face 
of a distant enemy." Barry, "The Development of the Submarine," 80 ]. Royal 
United Serv. Inst. 126, 138 ( 1935). 
11 Herodotus, Book VIII Urania 584-85 (Isaac Taylor trans!. 1829). See also 
Field, "The Beginnings of Submarine Warfare," 64 J. Royal United Serv. lnst. 382, 
383 (1919). 
7 See e.g. Bolander, "The Alligator_, First Federal Submarine of the Civil War," 
64 Nav. Inst. Proc. 845 ( 1938); Von Kolnitz, "The Confederate Submarine," 63 
Nav. Inst. Proc. 1453 (1937). See generally Lake, The Submarine in War and 
Peace (1918) aqd Fyfe, Submarine Warfare_, Past and Present (2nd ed. 1904). 
8 "The way·· in which Germany used her submarines in the very earliest stages of 
the war showed that she had little or no idea as to the immense power of the weapon 
lying in her hands." Gibson & Prendergast, The German Submarine War 1914-1918 
350 ( 1931). 
9 Nimitz, "Military Value and Tactics of Modern Submarines," 38 Nav. Inst. Proc. 
1193 ( 1912) . It rna y be noted that the same officer who recommended use against 
warships served as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet during World War 
II when U.S. Navy submarines were used primarily against Japanese merchant ships. 
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the prenuclear submarine was its dependence upon two separate pro-
pulsion systems, one for use on the surface and the other for use sub-
merged.10 A wide variety of surface propulsion systems were employed 
until the development of the diesel engine which shortly became the stand-
ard for surface propulsion. The dual-powered submarine was essentially 
the surface torpedo boat conjoined with a limited submergence capability. 
Its operational range and its speed on the surface were considerably greater 
than its range and speed submerged. Storage batteries were uniformly 
employed for underwater propulsion and this resulted in drastically limited 
submerged speeds and endurance. The German oceangoing submarine of 
the F.irst World War had an endurance of from twenty-four to thirty-two 
hours underwater at a speed of about five knots. If the submarine operated 
for even a very short period ·of time at maximum underwater speed it 
greatly reduced its underwater range. The oceangoing submarine of World 
War I typically had a cruising range of from 5,000 to 8,000 miles on the 
surface. During both World Wars submarines were armed with torpedoes, 
mines, and guns. The guns, of course, could only be used on the surface. 
There was only a small improvement effected in underwater speeds 
between the First and Second World Wars. During the First World War 
most oceangoing submarines had a maximum surface speed of from ten 
to fourteen knots. During the Second World War the maximum surface 
speeds were raised to perhaps seven teen to twenty knots. These speeds were 
low in comparison with the maximum speed of destroyers which was 
twenty-eight to thirty knots during World War I and at least a few knots 
higher during World War II. 
In both World Wars the dual-powered submarine required relatively 
long periods between sea operations for repairs and overhaul. In addition, 
submarines typically required a voyage of some duration before reaching 
the area of actual operations. Consequently, the number of submarines 
engaged in war operations at a particular time was no more than a frac-
tion of the total submarines in a particular navy. 
A technical listing of submarine types has included arctic, aircraft car-
rier, cargo, midget, and minelayer among others.11 Submarine merchant 
vessels, best known through the German Deutschland which cruised to the 
10 The technical information in the present subsection is based upon Kuenne 9-31 
and upon the naval encyclopedias, Jane's Fighting Ships (Blackman ed.; annual) 
and Les Flottes de Combat (Le Masson ed.; biennial). 
11 Committee on Undersea Warfare of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, An 
Annotated Bibliography of Submarine Technical Literature, 1557-1953 96-104 
(1954). 
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United States carrying cargo during the First World War/2 are not 
usually armed. 13 
b. COMBAT CAPABILITIES 
The characteristics of submarines imposed limitations upon their 
combat capabilities. At the beginning of the First World War the German 
Navy contemplated use of submarines against warships rather than against 
merchant ships.14 In spite of some success in sinking surface warships/5 
the submarine was soon redirected toward merchant shipping. In the First 
World War, German submarines sank more than 11 million tons of Allied 
and neutral merchant shipping.16 It was well known that the German 
submarine war brought the United Kingdom to the brink of defeat before 
the United States entered the First World War.17 Finally, the use of con-
voys to protect merchant shipping combined with drastic and compre-
hensive antisubmarine measures brought about the Allied victory.18 
Admiral Jellicoe has described the antisubmarine effort as it existed in 
November 1917 when he was the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty. 
On the German side were some 1 7 8 submarines. On the British side 
the forces in use to overcome these 178 submarines included approxi-
mately: 
277 Destroyers 49 Yachts 
30 Sloops 849 Trawlers 
44 "P" Boats 867 Drifters 
338 Motor Launches 24 Paddle Mine-sweepers 
65 Submarines 50 Airships 
68 Coastal Motor-boats 194 Air-craft 
77 Decoy ships 
12 7 Hackworth 459-61. See also Duncan, "Deutschland-Merchant Submarine," 
91 Nav. lnst. Proc. No· 4, 68 ( 1965); Hershey, "The Deutschland," 9 A.].l.L. 852 
(1916). 
The use of nuclear submarines as commercial tankers is recommended in Gallatin, 
"The Future of Nuclear-Powered Submarines," 84 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 6, 23 ( 1958). 
13 Twenty-seven submarines or submersibles for undersea research purposes are 
described in U.S. Interagency Committee on Oceanography, Undersea Vehicles for 
Oceanography 21 ( 1965). 
14 Spindler, "The Value of the Submarine in Naval Warfare," 52 Nav. lnst. Prqc. 
835,837 (1926). 
15 The best known example is the sinking of the British cruisers Aboukir, Hogue, 
and Cressy on Sept. 22, 1914 by the German U- 9. Gibson & Prendergast, The Ger-
man Submarine War 1914-1918 7-10 (1931). 
16 Anderson, "The Protection of Commerce in War," 78 Nav. lnst. Proc. 881, 
883 (1952). 
17 Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War (1920); Sims, The Victory at Sea (1920). 
18 Ibid. 
In addition to this great fleet of vessels 'engaged in the war against 
the 178 German submarines we laid over 10,000 mines in the last three 
months of 1917 in the Heligoland Bight and the Straits of Dover, sole-
ly for the purpose of destroying some of these submarines, whilst in 
1918, in addition to further very e~tensive mining in the Heligoland 
Bight and Straits of Dover, some 100,000 mines were laid in the North 
Sea Barrage. Can any better proof be afforded of the difficulty of anti-
submarines warfare, than is given by these figures? They show clearly 
the immense effect on Naval warfare, and Naval policy, of the in-
troduction of a completely new offensive weapon. 19 
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The decoy ships referred to by Admiral J ellicoe are the Q-ships of fame 
or infamy depending upon the acceptance of the British or German view-
point.20 These ships appeared to be innocent merchantmen but were 
actually heavily armed warships manned by Royal Navy personnel. Their 
function was to lure German submarines to the surface and to destruction. 
When a submarine attempted to carry out the time-honored procedures 
of visit and search it became a nearly helpless object of attack.21 
Submarine warfare cannot be considered apart from what has been, 
thus far, the submarine's principal object of attack, the merchant ship. 
The solitary merchantman, unarmed and unescorted, was no match for 
the submerged submarine assuming, of course, that it was not actually a 
Q-ship. A convoy consisting of merchant ships and an adequate group of 
naval escort vessels was usually more than a match for a single submarine. 22 
In addition, a merchant ship could seriously damage or sink a submarine 
by ramming. 
In the Second World War, German submarines sank more than 23 
million tons of Allied and neutral merchant shipping. 23 In the Pacific war 
United States submarines sank approximately sixty percentum of the 9 
million tons of Japanese merchant shipping which were destroyed by 
the end of the war. 24 It seems clear that the destruction of the Japanese 
merchant marine was a major factor in obtaining victory in the Pacific. 
United States submarines were also used in support of fleet operations and 
against Japanese warships. 25 
19 Jellicoe, The Submarine Peril: The Admiralty Policy in 1917 183 (1934). 
~British views appear in Campbell, My Mystery Ships ( 1928) and Chatterton, 
"Q" Ships and their Story ( 1922). The German view appears in Tzschirner, Die 
Baralong-Bestialitat ( 1918). 
21 See generally Potter & Nimitz 462. 
22 Potter & Nimitz 466-70; Cooke, "The Atlantic Convoys," 76 Nav. Inst. Proc. 
863 ( 1950). 
23 Anderson, supra note 16 at 881. · 
24 I d. at 887. 
25 Forrestel, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance~ USN: A Study in Command 79, 135-
42 ( 1966); Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War I I 361- 72 
( Ch. 25 entitled "Submarine Support of Fleet Operations") ( 1949). . 
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Japanese submarines en joyed no comparable success in attacking Allied 
merchant shipping. One reason for the success of United States submarines 
directed at Japanese merchant shipping was that the Japanese Navy never 
gave _ a major role to the protection of merchant shipping or to antisub-
marine measures. 26 Such activities were considered contrary to the Japanese 
Navy doctrine of the offensive which regarded United States warships as 
its most important targets. 27 In spite of a few notable successes the J apa-
nese submarines were not able to combat adequately the U.S. Navy surface 
warships. In addition, there is considerable evidence that the Japanese 
submarine power was dissipated in militarily inefficient operations. Pro-
fessor Kuenne has summarized: 
[Japanese] submarine resources were squandered on futile searches for 
Allied men-of-war, on quixotic land bombardments, and on hopeless 
supply operations for lost garrisons. These employments are evidence 
of a total bankruptcy of strategic doctrine concerning the submarine, 
and the record of the Japanese in these respects constitutes the most 
shameful avoidable waste of a military resource in World War II. 28 
Nonpowered cargo submarines or submersibles which are towed by 
powered submarines may be regarded as a future method of sea transport 
both in peace and in war. The Japanese built such submarines and em-
ployed them in the Second World War in attempting to supply isolated 
and bypassed Japanese Army garrisons. 29 In addition, it is interesting to 
note that the Japanese Army, probably because of a lack of interservice 
cooperation and confidence, built and operated submarines which were 
manned by army personnel and used to supply Japanese Army garrisons. 30 
2. The Nuclear-Powered Submarine 
a. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
The contemporary nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines 
28 Atsushi Oi, "Why Japan's Anti-submarine Warfare Failed," 78 Nav. lnst. Proc. 
587 ( 1952) 0 
27 Hashimoto, Sunk: The Story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet~ 1941-1945 62 
( 1954) 0 
28 Kuenne 4, 5. 
29 Such a submarine is described briefly in Bulkley, At Close Quarters: PT Boats 
in the United States Navy 216-17 (1962). Technical description of this type of ves-
sel termed "cargo carrying pipe" appears in Shizuo Fukui (ex-Constructor Lieut. 
Comdr., Japanese Navy), Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of War 205, 206 
( 1947, published in cooperation with U.S. occupation authorities in Japan) (copy 
in Mahan Library, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.). 
30 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Naval Analysis Division, 2 Interroga-
tions of Japanese Officials-Submarine Warfare OPNAV-P-03-100, Nav No. 72, 
USSBS No. 366 ( 10 Oct. 1945). Technical descriptions of the Army "transport 
submarines" appear in Fukui, op. cit. supra note 29 at 217. 
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are very different warships from their predecessor submarines of both 
World Wars. 31 The use of a single high-power system for both submerged 
and surface cruising has eliminated the limitations of a dual-powered 
system. Perhaps the most striking feature of nuclear power is that the 
submarine is now truly a submersible. When it comes to the surface it 
does so because of tactical considerations and not because of inability to 
cruise submerged for great distances. Its hull is streamlined and designed 
for submerged rather than surface cruising. 
The nuclear-powered submarine is one of the fastest warships and has 
the capability of maintaining high speeds for long periods of time. Since 
it is designed for submerged rathe~ than surface cruising it is typically 
capable of a higher underwater than surface speed. In 1955 the N au til us, 
the first of the United States nuclear submarines, traveled at an average 
submerged speed of sixteen knots maintained for over 1300 miles. The 
N au til us does not have the streamlined hull designed to increase under-
water speed which the later nuclear submarines have. Accurate official 
information on contemporary speeds is not available. One civilian authority, 
however, has stated: "Speeds of at least 30 knots submerged are now 
taken for granted, and indeed targets of 50 knots are talked of by some as 
possible in the future." 32 
The increase in the operational range of submarines is even more strik-
ing than the speeds now obtainable. Using the Nautilus as an example 
again, its "second reactor [core] was pulled and replaced in 1959 during 
routine overhaul after 26 months and steaming 93,000 miles of which 
78,885 was [sic] underwater." 33 The Triton, a newer nuclear submarine, 
"circumnavigated the globe submerged in 1960 for 83 days and 41,500 
miles at an average speed of 18 kts. She refuelled in mid-1962 after steam-
ing 110,000 miles." 34 
The newer nuclear submarines operate at great depths. One authority 
has suggested a depth of 900 feet for contemporary submarines. 35 If this 
figure represents a safe operational depth, it is probable that these sub-
marines could occasionally operate at greater depths on an emergency 
basis. 
The contemporary emphasis on nuclear submarines in the U.S. Navy 
is demonstrated by the existence of sixty nuclear submarines out of a 
31 The technical information in the present subsection is based in substantial part 
upon the following sources: Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66; Les Flottes de Combat 
1966; and Kuenne 177-92. 
32 Kuenne 180. 
83 Jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 372. 
a. I d. at 370. See Beach, Around the World Submerged ( 1962). 
35 Kuenne 181. 
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total of 140 submarines. 36 The respective figures for the Soviet Navy are 
thirty-five and 390 37 and for the British Navy, two and 42.38 
b. COMBAT CAPABILITIES 
Nuclear energy has also equipped the nuclear-powered submarine 
with the most awesome and devastating weapons of mass destruction. 
The latest United States fleet ballistic missile submarines each carry six-
teen Polaris type A-3 missiles, each of which can project a warhead of 
approximately . 75 megatons for a distance of approximately 2800 miles.39 
These missiles are regarded as being capable of high precision aiming 
considering the distances involved. In summary, a single fleet ballistic 
missile submarine carries approximately twelve megatons of TNT explo-
sive equivalent. This is greater than the explosive equivalent of the entire 
Allied aerial bombing operations during the Second World War. 40 These 
basic energy weapons with their rapid missile delivery systems will be 
appraised juridically in Chapter V concerning weapons of attack. 
The fleet ballistic missile submarine with its strategic bombardment 
function comprises one of the two principal types of nuclear submarines. 
The other is the nuclear attack submarine and it apparently has approxi-
mately the same functions of attack against merchant ships and warships 
as did the traditional submarine of the two World Wars.41 Both types 
have weapons which are designed for submerged firing and the deck guns, 
typical of the earlier submarines, are not mounted on the nuclear ones. 
The nuclear attack submarine is equipped with nuclear weapons of the 
type usually described as tactical. These weapons include very high-speed 
homing torpedoes which may be directed at either surface ships or other 
submarines.42 They also include an antisubmarine rocket, "SUBROC," 
which is launched from a submerged submarine's torpedo tube and 
operates underwater-to-air-to-underwater.43 In short, the offensive capa-
bility of the new attack submarine is vastly greater than that of its prede-
cessors during the World Wars. 
The nonnuclear submarine was readily outclassed in speed by destroyers 
and other surface warships as well as by some merchant ships. In contrast, 
the nuclear submarine may well be able to outrun its most speedy surface 
opponents whether it is attempting to take defensive and evasive action 
or is attacking surface warships. Historically, the traditional submarine 
36 jane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 460. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. The respective figures for France are zero and nineteen. Ibid. 
39 Kuenne 178. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kuenne 188-91 and passim. 
42 Martell, "Defending the Sea," Industrial Research 95, 98 (March 1966). 
~Ibid. 
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has not usually been a militarily effective combatant unit employed 
against modern surface warships. 'The offensive capabilities of the new 
attack submarine may well have changed this situation so that surface 
warships become principal objects of attack. 44 
There can be no doubt but that the combat capabilities of antisub-
marine warfare have also been greatly increased since the end of the 
Second World War. 45 It would be hazardous, nevertheless, to assume that 
antisubmarine warfare has kept pace with submarine warfare. It must be 
recalled that in two World Wars the dual-powered German submarines 
were almost successful in defeating all antisubmarine efforts.46 One pro-
fessional observer has recently concluded that "the submarine has opened 
a yawning gap between its own capabilities and those of the ASW forces." 47 
In addition, the convoy system which was one of the chief means of 
defeating the traditional submarines was based upon a concentration of 
shipping. One may wonder to what extent concentration, rather than 
dispersal, ~nvolves unacceptable ·risks in an era of tactical and strategic 
nuclear weapons. 
3. Future Submarine Warfare 
There is, of course, no reason to believe that contemporary attack 
and fleet ballistic missile submarines represent the final- development of 
submarine warfare or warfare submerged.48 Without indicating all of the 
possibilities, it has been suggested that the future "ocean-based missile 
force could conceivably take some totally new direction of development 
in the future which would hopefully combine many of the better charac-
teristics of the land-based force." 49 
The same report continues: 
Such developments may, for example, take the form of missiles of 
Polaris' size or even considerably larger placed on relatively shallow 
44 Kuenne 189. 
45 Weakley, "Antisubmarine Warfare-Where Do We Stand?" Naval Review 1965 
2 ( 1964). 
~The antisubmarine war against Germany in World War II is described in 1 
Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle 
of the Atlantic ( 194 7) and U.nited Kingdom Gov't, The Battle of the Atlantic 
( 1946). 
Popular accounts appear in Farago, The Tenth Fleet ( 1962) and Lewis, The 
Fight for the Sea ( 1961). Each of these two contains inaccuracies and the latter at 
204 even confuses the civilian and naval heads of the British Navy. 
41 R. H. Smith, Jr., "The Submarine's Long Shadow," 92 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 3, 
p. 30, 34 (1966). 
'B See generally Grenfell, "The Gro~ing Role of the Submarine," 89 Nav. Inst. 
Pro c. No. 1, p. 49 ( 1963). 
49 Report of the Panel on Oceanography of the President's Science Advisory Com-
mittee, Effective Use of the Sea 33 ( 1966). 
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underwater barge systems on the Continental Shelf in a way which , 
conceals their location and requires the system to move infrequently 
so that the potential of its being tracked by motion-generated noise 
is minimized. In addition one might consider a slightly mobile ocean-
bottom system which creeps along. 50 
It should not be necessary to emphasize the common interest of all states 
and all people in abolishing the weapons of mass destruction through 
effective international control. Until this is done, it is the comparatively 
modest function of the laws of war to limit their use, whenever possible, 
in order to protect humanitarian values. 
B. PRINCIPAL CLAIMS CATEGORIES IN SUBMARINE 
WARFARE 
The factual process of coercion gives rise to claims and counterclaims 
concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of various methods and tech-
niques of naval warfare. These claims and counterclaims are advanced 
by the neutral states as well as by the belligerent ones. They constitute the 
particular juridical controversies which are resolved by the decision-makers 
through the application of the legal doctrines. 
It is helpful for purposes of systematic organization and appraisal to 
identify and group together each of the major claims categories. Each 
such category comprises a closely related group of claims and counter-
claims which raise significant juridical issues. In submarine warfare there 
are four major categories of claims. 
I. Claims Concerning Combatants 
Only individuals who have lawful combatant status are entitled to 
exercise violence during war or hostilities. Such individuals, upon capture 
by the enemy, are to be accorded the standard of treatment prescribed 
by international law for prisoners of war. Unlawful combatants who are 
captured enjoy considerably less protection under law. 
In naval warfare the basic combatant unit is typically a vessel or air-
craft which is manned by a group of individuals. A warship or a naval 
aircraft is a lawful combatant unit since it satisfies the dual legal require-
ments of public authorization and control. The lawful combatant status 
of the crew members is associated with that of their warship or aircraft. 
The submarine, unlike other warships, has been the subject of controversy 
concerning its combatant status. The principal claim has been that it 
50 Ibid. See id. at 30-40 concerning oceanography, national security and submarine 
or submerged weapons. See also Craven, "Sea Power and the Sea Bed," 92 Nav. 
lnst. Proc. No.4, p. 36 (1966); Alexander, "Oceanography and Future Naval War-
fare," 89 Nav. Inst. Proc. No. 6, p. 66 ( 1963). 
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should be denied lawful combatant status. The countering claim is that 
the submarine has the same combatant status as any other warship.51 
2. Claims Concerning Areas of Belligerent Operation 
The high seas are employed in time of war for the conduct of sub-
marine warfare. These are the same areas which are employed by neutral 
states for interneutral trade as well as for trade with one or more of the 
belligerents. These conflicting uses give rise to claims and counterclaims 
between belligerents and neutral states. The typical belligerent claim is to 
establish a submarine operational area from which neutral merchant 
shipping may be legally excluded with the sanction of sinking without 
further warning if such shipping persists in entering the area. This claim 
is used by the belligerent to reach. the enemy belligerent through the 
neutral states which supply the enemy belligerent and so support its war 
economy. The typical neutral counterclaim is that neutral merchant ships 
have the legal right to use the high seas without being subjected to this 
type of belligerent action. 
There are also interbelligerent claims concerning submarine operational 
areas. The typical claim is to employ the operational area against the 
enemy belligerent as a distinctive method of submarine warfare.52 
3. Claims Concerning Objects and Methods of Belligerent 
Attack 
Claims and counterclaims concerning the lawfulness of particular 
objects as targets of attack and claims and counterclaims concerning 
methods of attack are so closely related that they may be grouped con-
veniently in one category. A typical belligerent claim is that submarines 
may lawfully sink enemy merchant ships without warning. The countering 
claim is that enemy merchant ships may not be sunk lawfully unless the 
crew and passengers are assured a place of safety. 
Claims concerning objects and methods of attack in naval warfare also 
include the issue of the applicability to submarines of the generally recog-
nized legal duty to search for and rescue the survivors after each naval 
engagement. The claim is that submarines have the same legal obligations 
as other warships in this respect. The countering claim is that submarines 
simply do not have adequate· space to carry survivors and, consequently, 
the obligation to rescue survivors is inapplicable. 53 
4. Claims Concerning Weapons of Belligerent Attack 
The crucial importance of clai~s and counterclaims concerning the 
61 Claims concerning combatants are appraised in Chapter II. 
62 Claims concerning areas of operation are appraised in Chapter III. 
53 Claims concerning objects and methods ate appraised in Chapter IV. 
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lawfulness of weapons is demonstrated by the greatly increased efficiency 
of the traditional weapons combined with the development of contem-
porary weapons of mass destruction. The awesome characteristics of these 
latter weapons are far beyond that of the traditional '\veapons and tradi-
tional experience. It has been pointed out above that contemporary sub-
marines possess both a tactical and strategic nuclear capability. 
The most general claim in this category is that all militarily efficient 
weapons are lawful. The countering claim is that particular weapons are 
unlawful because they create suffering and injury disproportionate to their 
military utility. 54 
C. THE LAWS OF WAR: SOURCES, PRINCIPLES, AND 
SANCTIONS 
It is well known that war is accompanied by the destruction of human 
and material values. A central objective of the laws of war is to reduce the 
destructiveness involved in military operations by providing at least a 
minimum standard of protection to individuals. The individuals who are 
so protected comprise noncombatants and combatants including the 
wounded, the shipwrecked, and prisoners of war. 55 
1. Sources of Decision 
The decision-makers of international law, during both peace and war, 
in the present decentralized organization of the world community, include 
the officials of various international public organizations. The most impor-
tant contemporary international law decision-makers, however, are the offi-
cials of national states. These same national officials also act upon occasion 
as claimants concerning the exercise of coercion on behalf of their nation-
states. This duality of function permits, and indeed requires, reciprocity to 
operate as a sanction which promotes the common self-interest of the 
community of states in all rational claims and decisions. 56 Among the 
national decision-makers of the international laws of war is the military 
officer. In certain circumstances the military or naval commander must 
determine the legality of his own proposed military measures and of the 
measures employed by the enemy.57 
54 Claims concerning weapons are appraised in Chapter V. 
515 Relevant conventional and customary law authorities are cited infra In the 
present section. 
56 See McDougal & Feliciano 40. 
57 The Law of Naval Warfare section 310(b) states that: 
[A] subordinate commander may, on his own initiative, order appropriate reprisals, 
but only after as careful an inquiry into the alleged offense as circumstances 
permit. Hasty or ill-considered action may be found subsequently to have been 
unjustified and may subject the officer himself to punishment for violation of the 
laws of war. 
There is a similar provision in The Law of Land Warfare paragraph 497(d). 
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The decision-makers are authorized to resort to the legal doctrines of 
both conventional and customary law in making particular decisions. The 
function of these doctrines is not, of course, to automatically direct the 
decision-makers to a predetermined decision.58 It is rather to direct their 
attention to the significant common values of the community of states 
which are protected by the laws of war. Since the doctrines are to be 
considered in varying contexts there must be careful factual analysis as a 
preliminary to equally careful ascertainment of doctrinal relevance and 
applicability. In addition, appropriate weight must be given to the chang-
ing conditions of war including its changing technology. So conceived, the 
legal doctrines may be utilized to enhance rational and just decisions. 
Illustration of some of the s,ignificant factors which should be consid-
ered in decision is provided by the j~dgment of a United States Military 
Tribunal in The Flick Trial. 59 
They [the provisions of Hague Convention IV of 1907] were written 
in a day when armies travelled_ on foot, in horse-drawn vehicles and 
on railroad trains; the automobile was in its Ford Model T stage. Use 
of the airplane as an instrument of war was merely a dream. The 
atomic bomb was beyond the realms of imagination. Concentration 
of industry into huge organisations transcending national boundaries 
had barely begun. Blockades were the principal means of 'economic 
warfare.' 'Total warfare' only became a reality in the recent conflict. 
These developments make plain the necessity of appraising the con-
duct of defendants with relation to the circumstances and conditions 
of their environment. Guilt, or the extent thereof, may not be deter-
mined theoretically or abstractly. Reasonable and practical standards 
must be considered. 
a. CONVENTIONAL LAW 
The conventional or treaty laws of war, based upon the express 
agreement of states, 60 are properly associated with international confer-
ences, such as those at the Hague and in Geneva. The latest significant 
example of lawmaking concerning war by international convention are 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims. 61 
58 Contrast Stone, Aggression and World Order 10-11 and passim ( 1958) which 
is criticized in McDougal & Feliciano 151-55. 
59 9 Reps. U.N. Comm. 1, 23 (1947). 
60 The Soviet Union emphasizes express agreement over other sources. Ramundo, 
The (Soviet) Socialist Theory of International Law 1-2, 27-28, 57-58 (George 
Washington Univ. lnst. for Sino-Soviet Studies No. 1, 1964). 
81 Geneva Convention for the Ameli~ration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. & 0./.A. 3114 (1956), T.I.A.S. 3362; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. & 0./.A. 3217 (1956), 
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The detailed rules of these Conventions provide for some substantive ill).-
provements over preexisting conventional and customary law concerning 
the same subjects. It is unfortunate, however, that the prescription of law 
by explicit agreement has rarely achieved more than a restatement or 
codification of the existing customary consensus on the particular subject. 
The national negotiators meeting at international conferences in time of 
peace must be concerned about the future security of their respective 
states and are understandably hesitant to recommend rules which are 
unlikely to meet the test of a future war. 
The principal international conventions or agreements which provide 
rules and principles conerning the conduct of war at sea are: 
Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Sub-
marine Contact Mines ( 1907) 62 
Hague Convention IX Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces 
in Time of War ( 1907) 63 
Hague Convention XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard 
to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War ( 1907) 64 
Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers in Naval War ( 1907) 65 
The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at 
Sea ( 1949) 66 
Article 22 of the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval 
Armament (London, 1930) 67 
Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty is the only express agreement 
directed to the regulation of submarine warfare. It is set forth and inter-
preted in Chapters III and IV of the present study. Article 23 of the 
same treaty provides that "Part IV [art. 22] shall remain in force without 
limit of time." Prior to the expiration of the other provisions of the Treaty 
the parties to it invited all other states to agree to the article 22 rules 
through the Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare 
Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London (of 1930) (November 6, 
1936). 68 The rules, consequently, are now in effect between forty-eight 
T.I.A.S. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 
U.S.T. & 0./.A. 3316 (1956), T.I.A.S. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. & 0./.A. 3516 (1956), 
T.I.A.S. 3365. 
62 36 Stat. 2332 ( 1910), T.S. 541. 
63 36 Stat. 2351 (1910), T.S. 542. 
6
" 36 Stat. 2396 ( 1910), T.S. 544. 
65 36 Stat. 2415 ( 1910), T.S. 545. 
66 6 U.S.T. & 0./.A. 3217 ( 1956), T.I.A.S. 3363. 
67 46 Stat. 2858 ( 1930), T.S. 830. 
68 31 A.J.I.L. Supp. 137 (1937). 
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states, including--the principal naval powers, and the Holy See. 69 
b. CUSTOMARY LAW 
The pragmatic case-by-case development of the customary laws of 
war is, of course, a continuous process only in time of war or hostilities. 
This implicit agreement of states is, nevertheless, more comprehensive in 
doctrinal content and more effective than express conventional agreement 
in the development of the laws of war. In a fundamental sense it may be 
regarded as the accumulated juridical learning concerning the subject. 
Customary international law authorizes decision-makers to achieve con-
temporaneously effective and socially responsive decision by the rational 
evaluation of past authoritative experience. Thus, the inherited doctrines 
may be adapted to the needs of legal control in an era of rapidly changing 
technology or, in the alternative, be allowed to lapse and expire through 
disuse. In these respects the customary laws of war are similar to the 
Anglo-American customary common law. The laws of war tend to em-
phasize experience over logic 70 and, again like the common law, develop 
upon the basis of legislative or policy factors: "considerations of what is 
expedient for the community concerned." 71 A view of the relevant sources 
of law and of change in the customary laws of war is reflected in the 
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties but in the customs 
and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, 
and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and prac-
ticed by military courts. This law is not static, but continual adapta-
tion follows the needs of a changing world. 72 
The judgment of the United States Supreme Court in The Paquete 
H abana 73 provides illustration of the ascertainment and application of 
customary law to naval war. Coastal fishing boats operating from Havana, 
which were not participating in the war, had been captured by U.S. Navy 
vessels on blockade duty during the Spanish-American War. The issue 
was whether or not such craft could be captured and condemned. The 
Court responded negatively and stated: 
119 The parties listed in Dept. of State, Treaties in Force 292 ( 1966) include the 
major naval powers of World War II: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States. Other parties include Nepal, 
Saudi Arabia and Switzerland. 
70 Holmes, The Common Law 1 ( 1881, reprint 1938). 
71 I d. at 35. See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 112- 41 ( 1921). The 
same considerations are developed in constitutional law in Rostow, The Sovereign 
Prerogative: The Supreme Court and the Quest for Law 3-44 and passim (1962). 
72 1 I.M.T. 221. 
78 175 u.s. 677 ( 1900). 
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By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries 
ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast 
fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in 
fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and 
crews, from capture as prize of war. 74 
The doctrinal holding of the immunity of coastal fishing boats which do 
not participate in the war or hostilities was based entirely upon the cus-
tomary international law since it was not set out in any applicable inter-
national agreement or municipal regulation of the United States. The case 
also illustrates a function of the laws of war: humanitarianism will be ad-
vanced by the protection of noncombatants and their property when it is 
consistent with the maintenance of military efficiency. 
2. Basic Princi pies 
The basic principles of the laws of war usually refer to military 
necessity and humanitv. The principle of chivalry is sometimes added even 
though it appears to be only a relic of medieval times when combat be-
tween mounted warriors of high social status was regulated by formalistic 
rules. 75 The principle of military necessity has frequently been formulated 
in broad and open-ended terms. For example, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 
describe it as: 
[T]he principle that a belligerent is justified in applying any amount 
and any kind of force which is necessary for the realisation of the 
purpose of war-namely, the overpowering of the opponent. 76 
The quoted formulation and similar ones are so comprehensive as to 
permit great and unreasonable amounts and types of force to be legally 
justified. If such a statement of the principle were actually applied the 
result would be to sweep away the substantive restrictions of the laws of 
war. A more restrictive formulation of the principle is clearly desirable. 
One is set forth in the Law of Naval Warfare. 
The principle of military necessity permits a belligerent to apply only 
that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by 
the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of 
74 I d. at 686. 
75 Spaight 110-12 recounts incidents of chivalry between airmen in World War I. 
He also recounts the "change of spirit" in World War II. ld. at 118-19. 
Even in medieval times chivalry was inapplicable to civilians, peasant foot soldiers, 
and to enemy personnel of different religious identification. See, e.g., Keen, The Laws 
of War in the Late Middle Ages 243 ( 1965): "Gentlemen prisoners were usually 
treated well, and allowed to go free on parole .... But the story was different in the 
case of the noncombatant. The civilians, and above all the humble, suffered untold 
hardships in war." 
76 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 227. 
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and physical 
resources. 77 
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This formulation makes it clear that the principle is subject to the express 
prohibitions of the laws of war. Military necessity should be regarded as 
legalizing only that destruction which is necessary to the prompt achieve-
ment of lawful military objectives. More specifically, military necessity only 
justifies destruction which is both relevant and proportionate. Such destruc-
tion must be relevant to the attainment of lawful military objectives. It 
must also be proportionate in the sense of a reasonable relation between 
the amount of the destruction carried out and the military importance of 
the object of attack. Based upon past experience, the requirements as 
applied in actual war or hostilities are only that the irrelevance and dis-
proportionality of the destruction effected must not be great.78 
With this interpretation placed upon military necessity there remains 
a pervasive ambiguity in the conception of "lawful miltary objectives." 
The determination of the lawfulness · of particular objects of attack in 
submarine warfare is a central task of Chapter IV of the present study. 
The principle of humanity is formulated as follows in the Law of Naval 
Warfare: 
The principle of humanity prohibits the employment of any kind 
or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of the war, i.e., for 
the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. 79 
On first impression the formulation of the humanity principle appears to be 
an obvious tautology since it only prohibits the use of force which is not 
permitted under the principle of military necessity. In addition, the phrase, 
"the purpose of the war," is as open-ended and ambiguous as is the con-
ception of "lawful military objectives." The principle of humanity, con-
sequently, appears no more precise than that of military necessity. 
Both basic principles, nevertheless, protect important value interests of 
the world community. Until war and hostilities are abolished, the basic 
principles reflect the interest of states in conducting war or hostilities (at 
least for defensive purposes), but in conducting them with the least possible 
destruction of human and material values.80 It is wanton and unreasonable 
destruction which is made illegal by the principles of military necessity 
and humanity. 
The application of the two basic principles presents little difficulty in 
clear-cut factual situations. For example, it should be readily apparent that 
77 Law of Naval Warfare section 220(a) (tootnotes omitted). 
78 Compare the textual formulations with those appearing in McDougal & Feliciano 
524- 28 and in O'Brien, "Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War," 2 W orld 
Polity 35 at 48-5 7 ( 1960) . 
79 Law of Naval Warfare section 220 (b) (footnotes omitted) . 
• 
80 See McDougal & Feliciano 522- 23. 
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it is legally permissible under the principles for submarines to sink without 
warning those enemy merchant ships which are armed and convoyed by 
the naval forces of the enemy belligerent. It should be equally apparent 
that it is illegal under the principles to kill the helpless survivors of the 
same merchant ships.81 
In the many difficult and complex factual situations which arise the 
decision-maker may be aided by other and more specific legal principles. 
Whether there are other relevant principles or not, there is no substitute 
for careful factual analysis in each case combined with insight concerning 
the values to be protected by each of the basic principles. Illustration of 
the considerations which are involved in a careful juridical appraisal is 
provided by a United States Military Tribunal in United States v. List: 
Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifying 
the killing of innocent members of the population and the destruction 
of villages and towns in the occupied territory. Military necessity per-
mits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount 
and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy 
with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. In general, 
it sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the safety 
of his forces and to faciliate the success of his operations. It permits 
the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose de-
struction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; 
it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar dan-
ger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for pur-
poses of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction 
of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the nec-
cessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of inter-
national law. There must be some reasonable connection between the 
destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It 
is lawful to destroy railways, lines of communications or any other 
property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and 
churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. 
It does not admit the wanton devastation of a district or the willful 
infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for the sake of suffering 
alone.82 
Although stated in terms of military necessity, it may be noted that the 
quoted analysis is entirely consistent with the principle of humanity. In a 
superficial analysis the two principles may appear to be opposites. Never-
theless, the application of either principle as if the other did not exist 
81 The textual statement may be buttressed in other terms than military necessity 
and humanity. The killing of such survivors could be termed simply "murder on the 
high seas." 
82 11 Trials of War Crims. 757 at 1253-54. 
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would result in unbalanced decision. It is essential to apply each principle 
in the light of the other if the common interests of states are to be honored. 
From this perspective, each principle may be usefully conceived as merely 
an element of a larger composite principle which comprises both military 
necessity and humanity. 83 At the very least, the complementary character 
of the two traditional principles should be recognized and stressed in order 
to promote just decisions. 
3. Sanctions 
Laws of war of ideal doctrinal content would e:mphasize the principle 
of humanity over other principles. Such laws of war without enforcement 
would be less effective in protecting human values than laws in which the 
doctrinal content is frankly recognized as a compromise between humani-
tarianism and military necessity and which have at least a measure of 
enforcement. To achieve effectiveness it is necessary to adapt precise nine-
teenth century formulations of legal rules to the realities of modern naval 
warfare while maintaining the basic .principles and values in the rules 
rather than to abandon ·the attempt to regulate naval warfare. 84 It is also 
necessary to recognize that a usable conception of law, whether inter-
national or municipal, should include at least some element of sanction or 
enforcement. The term "sanction" is here used broadly to refer to any-
thing which promotes adherence to the law.85 If there is no possibility of 
enforcement it is illusory to invoke the label of "law." 
Since it is sometimes alleged that the laws of war are not law at all 
in the sense of being susceptible to enforcement, it should be mentioned 
that the sanction of the laws of war is the common conviction of the par-
ticipants in the war or hostilities that self-interest is advanced by adher-
ing to the law rather than by violating it. This is, of course, the same as 
the basic sanction for any other body of law whether international or 
municipal. 86 The conception is that the interests of the participants are 
not only mutual but reciprocal as well. It is recognized that the laws of 
war cannot be long sanctioned as to one participant alone. The sanction 
applies to all on the condition of reciprocity in observance. When reci-
procity in observance breaks down, acts of reprisal may be employed to 
induce observance. 
83 Compare McDougal & Feliciano 530 who state an "overriding conception of 
minimum unnecessary destruction [of values]." 
84 Colombos 786 issues a call to face the "realities of naval warfare" and quotes 
with approval Sir Samuel Evans' view that "precedents handed down from earlier 
days [should be used] as guides to lead and not as shackles to bind." Id. at 787. 
85 Compare the narrow conception in St. Korowicz, Introduction to International 
Law: Present Conceptions of International Law in Theory and Practise 5 ( 1959): 
"Retorsion (retaliation), reprisals, and war individually or collectively applied are 
the means by which sanctions are carried out." 
88 See McDougal & Feliciano 53. 
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The participants also share an interest in economy in the use of force. 87 
The destruction of values which is unnecessary to obtain military objec-
tives is obviously uneconomical use of force since it involves the expendi-
ture of force without a return in net military advantage. In addition, the 
unregulated use of coercion contrary to the laws of war will very likely 
increase the enemy's will to resist and thus will compel the use of a greater 
quantum of coercion than should have been necessary to secure the same 
military objective. It is conceded that the effectiveness of this sanction is 
dependent upon the rationality of the participants in the war or hostilities 
as well as their dedication to humanitarian values. 88 When a pathological 
desire for destruction as an end in itself supplants rational calculations of 
self-interest, there may be a corresponding breakdown in the enforcement 
of the laws of war. 
Reprisals are widely regarded as sanctions to obtain adQ.erence to the 
laws of war. 89 A reprisal measure is an act, otherwise unlawful, which one 
belligerent directs against the enemy belligerent in retaliation for illegal 
acts of warfare by the latter. The object of a reprisal is to obtain adherence 
to the laws of war and consequently when the opposing belligerent termi-
nates his illegal practice the reprisal should be stopped. Even the possibility 
of future reprisals is regarded as a sanction which deters a belligerent from 
violating the laws of war. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 reduce significantly the individuals 
against whom reprisals may be legally directed.90 The Geneva Sea Conven-
tion provides: 
Reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the 
personnel, the vessels or the equipment protected by the Convention 
are prohibited.91 
In anticipation of claims appraised in Chapter III, particular techniques 
of submarine warfare have frequently been claimed to be legitimate re-
prisals in both World Wars. For example, the German claim to establish 
submarine operational areas has been advanced as a legitimate reprisal in 
response to alleged illegalities in the British conduct of naval war. The 
British naval warfare methods were, in turn, based upon alleged German 
illegalities. Both the German submarine operational area and the British 
long-distance blockade were each claimed to be justified as a legitimate 
87 See the text accompanying note 116 infra. 
88 As an example of the enforcement of a part of the international laws of war 
see Wright, "The Value of International Law in Occupied Territory," 39 A.j.I.L. 
775 (1945). 
89 See generally Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 561-65. Concerning reprisals in naval 
warfare see 7 Hackworth 134-56. 
90 See Albrecht, "War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949," 47 A.j.I.L. 590,607-10 (1953). 
91 Art. 4 7. The protection includes warships' sickbays and their equipment. Art. 28. 
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reprisal. If appraisal is limited to their validity as measures of reprisal 
only, it is possible to conclude that the substantive law of naval warfare 
remains unchanged. The persistent and continuing character of these 
naval methods throughout both World Wars, however, may suggest that 
their use reflects a basic change in the customary international law of war. 
Reprisals have been invoked with such frequency in naval warfare that 
they may be regarded as having a legislative function. This function is to 
bring the traditional doctrines up to date so that they apply to the con-
temporary methods of war. 92 
War crimes trials may be regarded as a deterrent sanction for the laws 
of war.93 The conception is that the mere possibility of trials after the con-
clusion of the war may be an effective deterrent. It should not be assumed 
that only military personnel of the vanquished state will be subjected to 
trial. Although the personnel of victorious states are not usually subject 
to war crimes trials under international law, they may be subject to trial 
under municipal law including the military code governing the armed 
forces. The important point is that municipal military codes such as the 
United States Uniform Code of Military Justice 94 prohibit in substance 
the same type of conduct which is prohibited by the international laws of 
war. 
The submarine war conducted by Germany during the Second World 
War is the largest such military operation in history from the standpoint 
of the numbers of submarines and of submarine personnel involved.95 At 
the conclusion of that war there was one war crimes trial in which Ger-
man submarine personnel were charged with violation of the laws of war 
in killing the survivors of a sunken ship. This single instance was The 
Peleus Trial 96 in which the defendants were accused of killing survivors 
of a sunken merchant vessel by the use of gunfire and hand grenades. 
There is no record of any other case involving such charges directed at 
German submarine personnel. The fact that this case stands alone may 
be regarded as indicating its a berra tiona} character. 
In the ensuing chapters appraisal will be made of the war crimes trials 
92 See McDougal & Feliciano 675. 
93 See id. at 703-31 and Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 566-88. 
1!
4 64 Stat. 108 (1950), 10 U.S.C. sections ~01-940 (1964). 
95 Roskill 44 7 under the subheading "German U -Boat Losses" states that 1,162 
German submarines were built and commissioned during the war of which 785 were 
destroyed, 156 surrendered, and the remainder were scuttled. Jane's Fighting Ships 
1944-45 635 under the heading "War Loss Section" states that 781 German sub-
marines were destroyed. 
96 Trial of Eck, 1 Reps. U.N. Comm. 1. A more complete report of the same case 
including apparently the full trial proceedings appears in the entire first volume of 
Maxwell-Fyfe ( ed.), War Crimes Trials. See the description of the facts of the case 
in Langdon, "Live Men Do Tell Tales," 78 N av. I nst. Pro c. 17 ( 1952). 
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involving charges of violations of the laws of naval and submarine war-
fare. In particular the trial of Admiral Donitz of the German Navy before 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for violation of the law 
of submarine warfare during the Second War will be appraised. 
In evaluating the war crimes trials conducted by the victorious allies at 
the conclusion of the Second World War, Professor Lauterpacht has 
stated: 
The stature of those tribunals is bound to grow with the passage of 
time and their judgments will be increasingly regarded as a weighty 
contribution to International Law and justice. These judgments-
perhaps more than anything else-give a complexion of reality to any 
attempt at a scientific exposition of the law of war, which never before 
in history was so widely and so ruthlessly disregarded as in the Second 
World War. In that perspective the occasional criticisms of these 
courts as having been tribunals set up by the victor acting as judge 
in his own cause must be deemed to be of limited importance.97 
Such an analysis does not, of course, preclude appraisal of the substantive 
accuracy of determinations of law and of findings of fact made by particu-
lar war crimes tribunals including the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg. 
D. SITUATIONS WHERE THE LAWS OF WAR ARE 
APPLICABLE 
A duly declared war with states as the participants in which all of the 
participants recognize its character as "war" and in which there is no 
issue concerning illegal resort to coercion is the obvious situation where 
the laws of war apply. There are also other less obvious situations where 
these laws apply. 
There can be but little doubt that Germany's role in the Second World 
War was that of a state illegally resorting to coercion by a war of conquest 
and aggression contrary to its obligations under the Pact of Paris of 1928 98 
renouncing the use of war as an instrument of national policy. If it follows 
from this that every single military act of Germany, including its submarine 
war, is illegal, careful analysis concerning the legality of particular 
aspects of submarine warfare is unnecessary. It would simply be assumed 
that the officers and crew of each German submarine were war criminals 
without regard to whether they complied with the specific legal doctrines 
applicable to naval war or not. Employing the same reasoning, if the 
United States and the United Kingdom are regarded as states legally em-
ploying coercion, then it would follow that all of the particular features 
of their conduct of submarine warfare would be deemed lawful even 
97 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, "Preface" v. 
98 "The Kellogg-Briand Pact," 46 Stat. 2343 ( 1929), T.S. 796. 
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though they were substantially the same methods which were used by 
Germany. 
This issue concerning the relation between illegal resort to coercion and 
the applicability of the laws of war was raised in the Trial of List 99 before 
a United States Military Tribunal at the end of World War II. The 
prosecution argued that since Germany's wars against Greece and Yugo-
slavia were illegal wars that Germany obtained no legal rights as a belli-
gerent occupant and that the presence of German troops in those coun-
tries was unlawful. The Tribunal rejected the argument, stating: 
For the purposes of this discussion, we accept the statement as true 
that the wars against Yugoslavia and Greece were in direct violation 
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and were therefore criminal in character. 
But it does not follow that every act by the German occupation forces 
against person or property is a crime or ~hat any and every act under-
taken by the population of the occupied country against the German 
occupation forces thereby became· legitimate defense.100 
Other courts took the same position. It is particularly important that a 
claim by the prosecution which was similar to that made in the Trial of 
List was rejected by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 101 
The result is that the illegal character of a particular participant's resort 
to coerction does not relieve it from the applicability of the detailed rules 
of the laws of war. The soundness of this position seems clear in view of 
the central role of reciprocity as a sanction for the laws of war. Unless a 
distinction is made between the illegal character of resort to coercion and 
the applicability of the detailed requirements of the law concerning the 
conduct of the coercion, an aggressor state might evade the detailed doc-
trines by the simple expedient of being the aggressor. If the aggressor state 
were not subject to the law, it might shortly be claimed that the defending 
state was also freed from adherence to the specific doctrines. The result 
could be widespread destruction of human and material values of the kind 
protected by the laws of war. In consequence, if the humanitarian objec-
tives of the laws of war are to be effectuated, it is necessary that they be 
applied without regard to the question of illegality in the initial resort to 
coercion. 102 Therefore, in spite of the character of the German resort to 
coercion in World War II as well as the documented Nazi murders of 
99 8 Reps. U.N. Comm. 34. 
100 I d. at 59. 
101 The argument of the French Chief Prosecutor, M. de Menthon, appears in 5 
I.M.T. 387. The International Military Tribunal rejected the argument by necessary 
implication from its entire Judgment. 1 I.M.T. 171-341. 
10:~ The same conclusion is reached, after some equivocation, by Lauterpacht, "Rules 
of Warfare in an Unlawful War" in Law and Politics in the World Community 89, 
91-99 (Lipsky ed. 1953). 
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civilians on land, 103 the German submarine war must be appraised accord-
ing to the same juridical criteria applied to the United States and the 
United Kingdom submarine operations. By the same reasoning, the Japan-
ese submarine war must also be appraised by the same criteria. 
Another situation presenting- an issue concerning the applicability of the 
laws of war is that involving a war which includes participants other than 
states. For example, it has been stated with respect to collective action by 
the United Nations that this international organization "has a superior le-
gal and moral position as compared with the other party [presumably a na-
tional state J to the conflict." 104 From this it has been suggested that the 
United Nations might "forbid use of atomic bombs by a state while reserv-
ing the right to use them itself." 105 It has also been concluded that: 
[T]he United Nations should not feel bound by all the laws of war, 
but should select such of the laws of war as may seem to fit its pur-
poses (e.g., prisoners of war, belligerent occupation), adding such 
others as may be needed, and rejecting those which seem incompatible 
with its purposes. 106 
To the extent that the United Nations rejected particular portions of the 
laws of wars, the probable result would be lack of reciprocity and ensuing 
breakdown of the law. If the United Nations picked and chose among 
the laws of war this would seem to be an invitation for the opposing bel-
ligerents to do the same. During the Korean War, as a matter of fact, the 
United Nations carefully observed the laws of war. 107 This seems a more 
practical way of manifesting "a superior legal and moral position" than 
the quoted alternative. 
If one or more of the participants in war or hostilities is a rebel or in-
surgent group, there remain, nevertheless, the humanitarian reasons for 
the application of the laws of war. Describing widespread violence as 
"internal" does not mitigate its objective characteristics. In the United 
103 1 I.M.T. 171 at 232-38, 243-53. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel 
v. Adolf, the son of Karl Adolf Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/61, Dist. Ct. of 
Jerusalem, Israel, Dec. 11-12, 1961, affirmed Criminal Appeal No. 336/61 Sup. Ct. 
of Israel, May 29, 1962. 
The Eichmann case is cited only concerning the Nazi murders and not concerning 
jurisdictional authority under international law to conduct the trial because of doubts 
concerning the latter. For amplification see Mallison, "The Zionist-Israel Juridical 
Claims to Constitute 'the Jewish people' Nationality Entity and to Confer Member-
ship in It: Appraisal in Public International Law," 32 Ceo. Wash. L. Rev. 983, 
1043-46 ( 1964). 
104 Report of Committee on Study of Legal Problems of the United Nations, 
"Should the Laws of War Apply to the United Nations Enforcement Action?" 46 
Proc. A.S.I.L. 216, 217 ( 1952). 
105 I d. at 2 1 8. 
106 I d. at 220. 
107 Letter from U.S. Ambassador Warren R. Austin to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, July 5, 1951,25 Dept. of State Bull. 189 (1951). 
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States Civil War, a situation of widespread rebellion, the laws of war were 
applied. 108 If they had not been applied and if every single Confederate 
soldier or sailor had been treated as a traitor, the result would probably 
have been much greater destruction of values than actually occurred. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 undertake the regulation of violence 
in internal conflicts. The detailed rules of the Conventions are not appli-
cable as such in civil wars but the Conventions provide that each of the 
participants in an armed conflict "not of an international character" occur-
ring in the territory of a contracting party must be bound at least by the 
prescribed humanitarian standards. 109 
Finally, the laws of war are applicable in war or hostilities without 
regard to invocation of the label "war" or to the recognition of a state of 
war by the participants. In 'relevant part the four Geneva Conventions 
provide: . 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace 
time, the present Convention shalJ apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more 
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recog-
nized by one of them. 110 
As a matter of drafting, it might have been better to change the last clause 
to read "even if the state of war is not recognized by one or more of them." 
T 1: is clear, nevertheless, that one of the fundamental purposes of the 
Geneva Conventions is to obtain application of their detailed rules in all 
situations involving the use of international coercion and violence. The 
humanitarian objectives of the laws of war require an equally broad 
application of the customary laws of wars. ~~ 
E. LIMITED WAR AND THE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF INTER-
NATIONAL COERCION 
Profe~sor Quincy Wright has described the Historical functions per-
formed by \var: 
War has been the method actually used for achieving the major 
political changes of the modern world, the building of nation-states, 
the expansion of modern civilization throughout the world, and the 
changing of the dominant interests of that civilization.111 
The same writer, even in 1942 before the advent of atomic weapons, 
detected a certain modern disenchantment with war: 
108 Professor Francis Lieber was the principal author of U.S. War Dept., Instruc-
tions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Gen. Orders 
No. 100 (April 24, 1863). · 
109 Art. 3 of each Convention. 
110 Art. 2, paragraph 1 of each Convention. 
111 1 Wright, A Study of War 250 ( 1942) (footnote omitted). 
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There Is, however, a more. widespread opinion than in any other 
period in history that war has not functioned well in the twentieth 
century. From being a generally accepted instrument of statesman-
ship, deplored by only a few, war has, during the modern period, 
come to be generally recognized as a problem. 112 
The "problem" of preatomic times now involves the issue of survival of 
the human race unless war can be effectively controlled. 113 
In an era of weapons of mass destruction and of rapid missile delivery 
techniques there are sound reasons to consider limited war as the rational 
alternative to unlimited war until it is possible to abolish war altogether. 
Policy makers who are concerned with national self-interest have persua-
sive inducements to avoid a war of mutual catastropic devastation. This 
is not to say that an unlimited war is impossible since such a war could 
take place by accident or miscalculation. It is only to say that an unlimited 
war involving mass destruction without regard to rational political objec-
tives does not serve the interests of any of the participants in such a war. 
Limited war has been authoritatively described in these terms: 
A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes 
for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not 
demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are cap-
able and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement. Gen-
erally speaking, a limited war actively involves only two (or very few) 
major belligerents in the fighting. The battle is confined to a local 
geographical area and directed against selected targets-primarily 
those of direct military importance. 114 
In 1957 the United States Chief of Naval Operations stated his estimate 
of future probabilities: 
The Korean War was a limited war. A limited war is the type of war 
most likely to occur in the thermonuclear age. 115 
If a limited war with major powers among the participants is the most 
probable type of war, there are compelling strategic reasons to be prepared 
for it. There is also the opportunity to determine whether or not limited 
war provides the effective means for the juridical limitation of international 
coercion. Since limited war involves limited political objectives, it should 
be clear that the coercion which is employed to achieve the objectives of 
limited war must itself be limited both in scope and intensity. Assuming 
that the belligerents comprise major powers with nuclear and thermo-
nuclear capabilities, each must limit the coercion it employs. If this is not 
done it will provoke expanded countercoercion with a resulting escalation 
112 Ibid. 
113 See generally Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957). 
114 Osgood 142. 
115 Admiral Burke's words appear in his foreword to Cagle & Mason. 
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of the war. In short, the military principle of economy of force must be 
employed if a war is to be limited. This principle has been described as 
follows: 
It prescribes that in the use of armed force as an instrument of 
national policy no greater force should be employed than is necessary 
to achieve the objectives toward which it is directed; or, stated 
another way, the dimensions of military force should be proportionate 
to the value of the objective at stake. 116 
Another type of war is limited in the sense that the belligerents are not 
capable of greater military efforts than those involved in a limited war. 
From the standpoint of such belligerents the war may be deemed to be 
general in terms of the resources involved and the military effort exerted. 
For the neutrals, such a war will nevertheless be regarded as limited. 117 
Neutral interests in maintaining their peacetime activities should be a 
powerful influence upon the belligerents in limiting the coercion employed. 
It is not realistic to think that minor belligerents would be permitted to 
disrupt the peaceful activities of the world community by the employment 
of extensive military techniques. 
The result of either kind of limited war should be to reduce belligerent 
claims concerning legally permissible combatants, areas of operation, ob-
jects and methods of attack, and weapons of attack. If this is accurate, 
it appears to be probable that a limited war would enhance the role of 
law by reducing the types and amounts of the coercion employed. A 
governmental decision to fight a limited war rather than a general one 
would normally involve a high-level policy decision not to use some 
methods and degrees of coercion which are lawful under the laws of war. 
In view of the great disparity between the factual context of limited war 
and unlimited war, it is even possible that some of the traditional legal 
doctrines which were not honored during the World Wars, such as visit 
and search at sea, could be maintained in limited war situations. It is 
clear that a war of all-out thermonuclear devastation would leave little 
or no role for law. Consequently, the term "general war" is used to refer 
to a situation of comprehensive international coercion such as both the 
World Wars in which only the traditional weapons are employed or to 
the same type of war in which nuclear weapons are also employed but 
116 Osgood 1 B. 
117 It is recognized that the United Nations Charter has changed the law of neu-
trality. See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 64 7: 
While the Charter has affected in a decisive way the right of Members of the 
United Nations to remain neutral, it has not substantially abolished their right 
to neutrality either in wars between Members of the United Nations or in wars 
between non-Members or between Members and non-Members. 
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1n a carefully restricted manner. 118 General war in this sense and limited 
war, in contrast to an all-out war of mutual destruction, provide the 
opportunity to place meaningful juridical limitations upon the exercise 
of international coercion. In each of the ensuing chapters the central legal 
issues will be examined in the context of limited as well as general war.119 
118 This, in substance, is the recommendation concerning the use of nuclear weap-
ons in Cagle, "A Philosophy for Naval Atomic Warfare," 83 Nav. Inst. Proc. 249 
( 195 7). A similar recommendation appears in Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear 
Option ( 1966). 
119 The limited war context is not usually employed in studies of the law of naval 
warfare. It is apparently assumed that only general war is likely in the future. See 
e.g. the Colombos, Smith, and Tucker books. 
